II. To the Initial Arguments

A. To the First Argument

274. To the first initial argument [n.175] I say that the proposition ‘when the prior is destroyed the posterior is also destroyed’ is true of the simply prior, namely a prior on which the posterior depends; but it is not true of what is in some way prior yet on which the posterior does not essentially depend (as is the case with ordered effects, where the nearer cause is said to be prior to the more remote cause, and yet it would be possible sometimes for a cause to issue in a second effect though it were impeded by a first).

275. It could in another way be said that the proposition is true unless something else prior to the prior supplies the place of the prior, as is the case with God and the subject in respect of the accident here [sc. in the Eucharist].

276. The first response [n.274], however, is doubtful: how can a posterior effect be without the prior effect of the same cause when there is an essential order between the effects? For it was said often in Ord. I [d.17 nn.42, 83; d.27 n.83; also II d.1 nn.41, 44] that when a cause is of a nature to have ordered effects, it is not in proximate potency to producing the remoter effect unless the nearer effect has already been produced; and for this reason the Holy Spirit can only be spirated by the Father and the Son together, and for this reason a creature can only be created by the three Divine Persons together, and much else said there [Ord. I d.11 nn.12-18; d.12 nn.7, 27, 36; d.20 n.27].

277. The second response too [n.275] does not have place here, because although God may supply the place here [sc. in the Eucharist], that is, supply the causality of the subject in respect of the accident by conserving the accident without a subject, yet he does not supply the place of inherence in a subject, about which it is argued that it is prior to action extrinsically, unless you say that to this extent he supplies the place of inherence because he conserves it in being.

278. However, as to the form of the argument [sc. of the first initial argument, n.175], reply can be made by denying the minor, because the ‘being in’ of an accident is not essentially prior necessarily to ‘acting extrinsically’ (speaking of ‘being in some substance’), because both belong to an accident contingently, and the posterior also contingently has the prior before it. Indeed, action necessarily and essentially presupposes the being of the active form; but the fact that ‘being in’ is concomitant with ‘being’ is not necessary, nor necessarily pre-required for acting.

279. But when both respects, namely ‘being in’ and ‘acting extrinsically’, belong to the same form absolutely, then, although both come from outside, yet the first is not contingently disposed to the foundation in the way the second respect is, because the foundation (while the order of natural causes stands) always has the first effect, not so the second effect. And more things can prevent the second effect from ‘being-in’ than can prevent the first effect from ‘being-in’, because an impeding contrary can deprive the form of its acting, but only God can deprive it of its ‘being-in’.

280. Therefore, the minor [n.179] is false, because ‘being-in’ is not essentially prior to acting, but only being is essentially prior to acting, while ‘being-in’ is simply prior when considering the order of natural causes.

281. And then as to the confirmation about immediacy [sc. about ‘proper attribute’, n.176], I say that not everything that is more immediate to something is necessarily presupposed to everything more mediate, as that if the more immediate thing is not a cause with respect to the mediate thing (neither an active cause nor a receptive cause), the effect too is not simply necessarily nearer to the same cause. And so it is in the issue at hand: for ‘being-in’ has this immediacy, because by natural causes it follows the foundation at once, namely such that by no natural cause is it impeded; not so with ‘acting’. But yet neither is ‘being-in’ an elicitive or receptive idea, nor is its effect simply necessarily prior to ‘acting’.

282. And if you say: ‘being-in’ is the proper attribute, ‘acting’ is an accident per accidens [n.176], the response is plain in the first question of this distinction [nn.32-33, 52, 77, 80]. For ‘being-in’ is not altogether a proper attribute, but it is a contingently inhering accident, though it happens for the most part; but an accident that happens for the most part does not necessarily precede an accident that happens for the least part, or happens either way.

B. To the Second Argument

1. Response to the Argument

283. To the second initial argument [n.177] I say that the proposition ‘to act belongs per se to a supposit’ is not got from the Philosopher Metaphysics 1.1.981a17-18 but what is got there is that ‘action concerns singulars’, and to this extent the Philosopher puts experience before art in acting, or the experienced man before the artisan [cf. Ord. III d.36 n.85]. But whence is the place [sc. the argumentative topic] got? ‘Action is about the singular as object; therefore, it belongs only to a supposit as agent’ [Ord. III d.8 n.14].

284. If this proposition is taken, ‘action belongs to a supposit’, then from somewhere else than the Philosopher here at least is this proposition picked up: ‘action belongs to the supposit as what is ultimately denominated by action, but not as all that is denominated by it’. This solution you can gather from Ord. I d.5 nn18-24, where is obtained how from the same abstract term, especially one that states a respect, many denominative terms can be taken that denominate many things on which that form [sc. the abstract term] falls, and does so in order. For example, from the abstract term ‘potentiality’ is taken the concrete term proximate to it, which is ‘potency, power’ and is said of heat; and further is taken the concrete term ‘potent, being able’ and is said of the fire possessing the heat. In the same way can be taken from ‘action’ a concrete term that denominates the formal principle of acting, and it would be said of ‘heat’, as in ‘if it exists, heat heats’, that is, ‘is that whereby the possessor of heat acts’, just as heat is a heating power but is not a potentiality nor potent or powerful.

285. But from ‘action’ is commonly taken only the denominative that denominates the ultimate denominative, at which the whole dependence of the form has its term; and I concede that, however much a form is denominated by action, yet if that form is of a nature to be in a supposit, the supposit could, by a further denomination, be denominated by ‘action’.

286. But you might say, ‘at least as this denomination, whereby something is said to act, is customarily used, the form will not be denominated by action, and so the proposed conclusion holds’ [n.177].

287. I reply: a form possessing the idea of form is not thus denominated, that is ‘an informing form’ (because it is then the reason why something else is denominated by this denomination), but a ‘non-informing form’ is thus denominated. But a being per se is not denominated by this denomination, for it can be denominated by another denomination, as was said before [n.284]; and if it does not depend further on some other denominated thing, its denomination will be ultimate. And so this proposition ‘to act belongs to a supposit alone’ is briefly expounded as ‘or belongs to something having the mode of a supposit’. And by this remark ‘having the mode of a supposit’ I understand nothing positive beyond the essence of the form; rather I understand only the negation of its informing anything that acts through the form.

288. As to the confirmation from Boethius [n.178], it can be said (as he himself speaks there about ‘by what it is’ and ‘what it is’) that, according to its ‘what’, each created thing has these distinct in some way, in the way that no created thing is pure being (on which see Ord. I d.8 n.32); but it is not necessary that in any created thing the ‘by what it acts’ and ‘what acts’ be distinct; for if angel or soul are the simple essence of their power and really so, what acts with intellective action and by what it acts are not really different. And so here [sc. an accident in the Eucharist], it is a certain being and a simple act, and it does not inform anything else.

289. The example brought forward about the soul in man [n.179] is only a proof about the ‘what’ and ‘by what’ in the case of existing, and this when taking the partial ‘by what’, not the total ‘by what’; and I say this because a man is a man by humanity as by the total ‘by what’, but by the soul he is a man as by a partial ‘by what’. And this is what is sometimes accustomed to be said about the form of the whole and the form of a part; the form of the whole indeed is the quiddity of the thing, including each essential part, and this is not different in reality from the ‘what’, but it is perhaps only different in mode of understanding [Ord. III d.2 nn.80-84]. And in this way the ‘what’ and ‘by what’ with respect to action can only differ when the ‘by what’ is the total ‘by what’, which is always at least the case when the ‘by what’ is in nothing else - and perhaps even when it is in something else, because then the subject has no causality of its own with respect to action; but yet it is then denominated (with remote denomination) by the action, because it is denominated by the principle ‘by what’ of the action.

290. As to what is added from Metaphysics III about mathematics [n.180], that ‘in mathematics there is neither agent nor good’, I say that the quantity in the Eucharist is not a mathematical principle; for the mathematician abstracts from natural qualities in the way he abstracts from substantial form (for the mathematician abstracts in this way from the natural as from the metaphysical, or more so). I concede therefore that if the quality existed alone, it would not be the principle of acting with the sort of action that we are speaking of here [n.289]; but the natural quality, which is here [in the Eucharist] in the quantity, can well have virtual touch in respect of a passive object.

2. A Doubt and its Solution

291. And if you ask, ‘does a separated quantity without a quality act on the senses?’, it seems that it does.

292. Because it is per se perceptible, On the Soul 2.6.418a17-20.

293. And again, it could act on the intellect, because it is per se intelligible; but it could not act on our intellect unless it first acts on the senses;     therefore etc     .

294. To the contrary, because a quantity is not perceptible primarily; but that which is not per se perceptible primarily cannot act without what is perceptible primarily.

295. It could be said that the quantity would not be perceived because: either it would (according to some) have no action on the senses by impressing on them its own species but only the proper sensibles do (the common sensibles,The proper sensibles are those perceived by only one sense, as color, taste, sound etc., and the common sensibles are those perceived by more than one sense, as size, shape, place etc. ⁵⁰ however, only do something for the manner of affecting the senses); or if a common sensible cause its own species along with a proper sensible (otherwise how could it properly be perceived?), yet it cannot cause it without the concomitance of a proper sensible - not indeed that it would not be prior to the primarily sensible quality and so able to be separated in itself from that quality, but that it would not be prior in acting on the senses, and so, insofar as it is of such sort, it is not separable from a proper sensible.

296. And perhaps the reason is that by which the senses are primarily receptive powers of their proper object; and therefore from nothing else can they receive another act unless they are naturally prior in this act.

297. And thus is plain the answer to the first argument [n.292].

298. As to the second [n.293] I say that a quantity could move the intellect if it were proportionate to it or proportionately present to it; but it is not so for our intellect, because a quantity can become primarily present to our intellect only through the species, and it cannot be caused in the intellect if the species of the object were not first in the senses.

C. To the Third Argument

299. To the third argument [181] I say that the proposition from On Generation that ‘agent and patient must have the matter in common’ can be understood of aptitudinal or actual commonness; but the separated accidents are of a nature [sc. are aptitudinally fit] to have the matter of the subject in common with the passive object.

300. Or in another way, it could be said that the proposition is only true of a univocal agent, for God and the heaven do not have matter in common with these things down here.

301. But this [n.300] is not a solution, because action of this sort on a contrary is univocal action.

302. Therefore the first response [n.299] is better, because from the fact that the form here [sc. in the Eucharist] is of the same idea as the form that is the term [sc. the form as in a substance], it follows that just as the form that is the term is in matter, so it is of a nature to be in matter; but it is not necessary that it be in act in matter as the former is, because to act belongs to a form that is maximally a per se being, but to be received or produced only belongs to the form in some susceptive subject.

D. To the Fourth

303. As to the fourth argument [n.182] from the Metaphysics, it could be brought in for my side; because I concede that a quality cannot be the principle for generating a composite substance. But in another respect it is brought in against me, because neither is a quality the principle for generating a composite quality, nor would a substantial form (even if it existed per se) be a principle for generating a composite substance - which, however, you would have to deny, just as you also deny it about a quality and a composite quality [nn.182, 186].

304. Therefore, first I say to the authority [from the Metaphysics, n.182] that the Philosopher’s intention is that Plato’s ‘Idea’ cannot be a principle for generating a composite substance, because no completely immaterial substance can generate a composite substance without the mediation of a body [cf. Ord. II d.3 n.208].

305. But how is this proposition true with him [sc. Aristotle]?

I say that it is so because he posits the order of causes in the universe to be simply necessary; and he sees the separate substances, according to his own position, as moving the heavens, so that they produce, through such movement, other things down below; but they would not thus move if they could immediately produce them, because then the order of causes would not be necessary - which for him would be unacceptable.

306. And for this reason one ought not to impose on him the lies‘Trufa’, a medieval word for ‘truffle’ but also for untruths or lies. ⁵¹ of some people, that a separated substance could not cause anything here below because of an imperfection, either such or such in a separated substance, or because of the disproportion between a simple and a composite - but only that they could not do so because of the order of causes. For he conceded that a simple substance causes the moved heaven, which heaven is a per accidens composite. Why then is it thus not a per se composite, since the agent has no greater fit with a per accidens composite (either in whole or in part) than with a per se composite?

307. But we do not agree with the Philosopher in the proposition: ‘the order of causes is simply necessary’ [n.305]. For he would say that a simple accident would not produce a qualified subject - not because he would deny that a simple accident (when it is in a subject) is the whole idea of acting, and thus that, if it could exist per se, it could also act per se, but because he would deny (because of the necessity of the order of causes with him) that this could be the case.

308. But as to what is said there [n.182], that ‘a substantial form, if it existed per se, could not, according to this authority of the Philosopher, be the principle for generating a composite substance’, this indeed contains a doubt. For if it is the case that, just as a quality is the total principle for altering something, so the substantial form of the generator is the total principle for generating, the up shot for us is to say that a substantial form that is a per se being can generate a substance - save that it would not be in a suitable mode for acting (for nothing has a suitable mode for acting on a matter quantum unless it is itself a quantum - speaking of a univocal agent).

309. But on the question whether a substantial form alone could be the principle for generating, or (what is more) that the substance alone would be the principle for generating, look above in the first article [i.e. the solution of the question, nn.257-260].

E. To the Fifth

310. To the fifth argument [n.183]: if the intelligible species were posited as the total principle of intellection, then it would appear that it could be the principle when separated - and let the same be said of charity in respect of love. But I have posited neither the one nor the other as the total principle, but as partial and less principal [Ord. I d.3 nn.559-560, d.17 nn.32, 40, 46, 67-70, 142, 157-158]. But a less principal principle can never act save with the principal one acting naturally first, and this when speaking of priority on the part of the agent itself - not as action or term received in the passive object, because thus the action of ordered agents on the passive object would by nature have the form as term simultaneously.

311. But does this argument work against others who hold the antecedent [n.310, ‘if the intelligible species were posited as the total principle of intellection’, from Thomas of Sutton, Ord. I d.3 nn.460-462]?

312. I say that the intelligible species, however much separated or conjoined, never understands. For nothing is said to understand save in this way, that it has such an intellection formally inhering in it; and so the proposition in On the Soul 3.4.429a13-15, that “to understand is to undergo,” is true to the letter, because ‘to understand’ is to have or to receive intellection. But the intelligible species is posited by no one as what properly receives intellection.

313. Hence the argument [sc. the fifth, n.183] that a separated species could understand would work more against him [Giles of Rome, cf. Ord. I d.3 nn.456-459], who posits that the species is the formal idea of receiving intellection than against those [n.311], who posit that it is the total active principle of intellection.

314. But I still deduce [from the argument, n.183] that at least the separated intelligible species could actively cause intellection - which seems unacceptable.

315. My reply: this does not follow unless the passive thing be proximate to what is receptive of intellection; but if it is so, one would as a result have to concede that it would cause intellection in the passive thing.

316. And to this extent there is one difficulty common to us and them, that however much causality we attribute to the species, whether partial active causality (as I said above, n.310) or only the idea of being the term or presenter of the object, the species would have this perfection in the same way if it were separate as if it were conjoined, as it seems.

317. Therefore if a separated species were not present to the intellect by inherence but by simple presence, it could suffice for causing intellection in the intellect in the same way as it does when it inheres. And this I concede, because I said above [n.312] that the intellect receives nothing of the perfection pertaining to itself from the species that informs it, but there is only need that the species, as another partial cause of the effect, come together with the intellect. But that a partial cause inheres in another cause is wholly accidental, because it could, without inhering, as equally perfectly cause the effect on account of other essential order, namely the order of subordination of active virtue to active virtue, to which the order of subject and accident is accidental.

318. And so I say briefly that charity in the fatherland will immediately cause intuitive intellection of itself in the intellect; and yet it is not present by inherence to the intellect but to the will - and yet this presence suffices for it to concur, as partial cause, with the other cause.

319. This argument [n.183], therefore, which is frequently made, works against no opinion save the opinion which posits that the species is the total active principle of intellection and that, along with this, it is the proper and proximate receptive subject of intellection, and that the same is able to move itself. But against those who posit in some way or other an activity of the species, it does not prove anything save that a separated species could act similarly to a conjoined species, provided however it had a proportionate passive thing present to it.

320. This holds in the same way of charity with respect to the act of love.